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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for terrorism (u.k.)
5 results foundAuthor: Great Britain. Home Office Title: Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues Summary: The UK faces a significant threat from international terrorism. The current assessed threat level to the UK can be found on the MI5 website1 where more information can also be found on what threat levels mean, who decides the level of threat and how the threat level system is used. Whilst there have been attacks against well protected targets around the world, experience shows that crowded places remain an attractive target for terrorists who have demonstrated that they are likely to target places which are easily accessible, regularly available and which offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone (for example, serious disruption or a particular economic/political impact). The purpose of this guide is to give advice about counter-terrorism protective security design to anyone involved in the planning, design and development of the built environment from the preparation of local planning policy to the commissioning, planning, design and management of new development schemes through to detailed building design. Whilst it draws largely on good practice examples from England and refers to legislation that applies to England, this guide will be of interest to the Devolved Administrations. This guide will also be of interest to designers/architects, town planners, engineers, highway engineers and police Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) and Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs). It will also be of interest to those who have responsibility for ongoing management and maintenance of public spaces and streetscapes and to conservation officers in the context of development in Conservation Areas. The guide gives practical advice on how best to incorporate counter-terrorism protective security measures into proposed new development schemes whilst ensuring that they are of high design quality. The advice that is set out is generic and cannot address the plethora of varying circumstances and degrees of risk which apply to different facilities. Consideration should first be given to the relevance of such measures and whether or not they can be appropriately achieved through the planning system in any particular case. If so, the measures should be appropriate, proportionate and balanced with other relevant material considerations. The aim of the guide is to equip the reader with a better understanding of the links between the counter-terrorism dimension of crime prevention and the built environment, so that reducing the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack can be tackled in an imaginative and considered way. The guide is not a manual to be applied by rote or a substitute for using skilled designers. Details: London: Home Office, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 27, 2012 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/crowded-places/design-tech-issues?view=Binary Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/crowded-places/design-tech-issues?view=Binary Shelf Number: 124283 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrime PreventionDesign Against CrimeTerrorism (U.K.) |
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Roots of Violence Radicalisation. Volume I: Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence. Summary: On 7 July 2005, 52 people were killed and more than 770 others injured in attacks on the London transport network carried out by four men from West Yorkshire who had been radicalised by the ideology and rhetoric of Al Qa’ida. The nature of the current, deadly threat facing the UK from home-grown terrorism was fully exposed for the first time. This was only one of a number of terrorist plots which caused the British authorities to shift their attention over the past decade from external threats to national security to those lying within the UK borders. Radicalisation is one of four strategic factors identified in the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, that have enabled terrorist groups to grow and flourish. Yet four years after 7/7, the reasons why some British-born and raised individuals are vulnerable to violent radicalisation remain unclear. On taking office in 2010, the Coalition Government announced a wholesale review of the Prevent Strategy (often referred to simply as “Prevent”), which was drawn up to tackle violent radicalisation in the UK in the wake of the 7/7 bombings. The original strategy had attracted criticism for its alleged exclusive focus on Muslim communities, spying, and unhealthy conflation of law enforcement with integration policy. The outcome of the Prevent Review was published in June 2011. In anticipation of this, we decided in May 2011 to launch an inquiry that would test the evidence base for the Prevent Review and explore issues regarding its implementation. We undertook to examine the root causes of violent radicalisation in the UK, the individuals and groups particularly vulnerable to radicalisation and the locations where this radicalisation tends to take place, in relation to the primary terrorist threats facing the UK. Specifically, we intended to: • determine the major drivers of, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements linked to (a) Islamic fundamentalism (b) Irish dissident republicanism and (c) domestic extremism; • examine the relative importance of prisons and criminal networks, religious premises, universities and the internet as fora for violent radicalisation; • examine the operation and impact of the current process for proscribing terrorist groups; • consider the appropriateness of current preventative approaches to violent radicalisation, in light of these findings, including the roles of different organisations at national and local level; and • make recommendations to inform implementation of the Government’s forthcoming revised Prevent strategy. Details: London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2012. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Nineteenth Report of Session 2010-12; Accessed March 21, 2012 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf Shelf Number: 124124 Keywords: Radical GroupsTerrorism (U.K.)Terrorists |
Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Roots of violent radicalisation Summary: This is the Government Response to the Nineteenth Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session 2010-12 HC 1446. This response contains details on the new Prevent strategy and plans in regards to the identification and removal of suspect website dealing with terrorism. Details: London: The Stationary Office, 2012. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 19, 2012 at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm83/8368/8368.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm83/8368/8368.pdf Shelf Number: 125359 Keywords: Radicalization (U.K.)Terrorism (U.K.)Violent Extremism (U.K.) |
Author: Law, Vincent Title: Is Reaction to Terrorist Attacks a Localized Phenomenon? Summary: Research found that the terrorist attack of 9/11 was associated with a temporary decline in US Arab and Muslim men’s weekly earnings and real wages of around 9 to 11 per cent. This has been interpreted as an increase in discrimination against those groups following the attack. However, other evidence shows that in Sweden the terrorist attack did not change Middle East immigrants’ job-searching behavior because of increased discrimination from employers. A possible explanation is that, since 9/11 occurred in the US, the reaction against Arab and Muslim men was more severe there than elsewhere, even though nationals from 90 other countries were also killed. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to examine the labor market experiences of UK-based Arab and Muslim immigrants. They could have been affected by either 9/11 (that killed 67 UK nationals) or the London bombings of 7th July 2005 (that killed 52 UK nationals), or both. Using Quarterly UK Labor Force Survey data, we explore the labor market outcomes of UK-based Arab and Muslim immigrants following both 9/11 and the London bombings. We estimate two difference-in-differences models — one for 9/11, and the other for the London Bombings and carry out the analysis separately for men and women. The results suggest that, while 9/11 had a lesser impact on the labor market outcomes of UK Arab and Muslim women, the London bombings had a statistically significant negative impact. These findings suggest that physical distance does matter for reaction to terrorist attacks. Details: Canberra: Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, 2011. 33p. Source: Crawford School Research Paper No. 10: Internet REsource: Accessed August 28, 2012 at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1933631 Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1933631 Shelf Number: 126158 Keywords: Discrimination (U.K.)Labor Supply (U.K.)Muslims (U.K.)Terrorism (U.K.) |
Author: Jackson, Emily Lindsay Title: Broadening National Security and Protecting Crowded Places - Performing the United Kingdom's War on Terror, 2007-2010 Summary: This thesis critically interrogates the spatial politics of two ‘fronts’ of the UK’s on-going war on terror between 2007-2010: first, broadening national security, the extension of national security into non-traditional social and economic domains; and second, security in ‘crowded places’, counter-terror regimes in the UK’s public spaces. It responds to the neglect within security studies of the spatial politics of this conflict by considering the spatial performativities enabling these two contemporaneous iterations of national security. The first part applies critical geopolitics and biopolitics frameworks to a case study of the new National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. It argues that UK national security reiterates the ‘interconnecting’ performativities of neoliberal norms as a ‘broadening’ understanding of national security which licenses a ‘broadening’ register of coercive policy responses. The second part carries out an exploratory case study of one such coercive policy response: security at the ‘crowded place’ of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art in Gateshead. It identifies crowded places security as reliant on practices of emptying out and ‘zero-ing’ space, pre-emptive 'zero tolerance' risk imaginaries, and extensive surveillance – both electronic and ‘natural’. In other words, counter-terrorism is becoming increasingly important in shaping daily life in the UK through a diverse range of spatial control practices. The thesis uses an innovative methodological and conceptual strategy combining Foucauldian discourse analysis of security policies, participant observation of situated security practices, with theoretical frameworks from political geography, international relations and visual culture. It also develops Judith Butler’s theory of performativity as a conceptual tool to critique the materialisation of contemporary spaces of security and counter-terrorism, from the meta-imaginative geographies of national security to the micro-spaces of counter-terrorism in UK public space. In sum, this thesis points towards new avenues for understanding the on-going encroachment of the war on terror into everyday spaces in the UK Details: Durham, UK: Durham University, Department of Geography, 2012. 265p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 4, 2013 at: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3498/1/Emily_Lindsay_Jackson_PhD.pdf?DDD14+ Shelf Number: 128666 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismCrowd ControlNational SecurityPublic Order ManagementPublic SpaceTerrorism (U.K.) |